

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trudemark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P O. Box 1450 Alexandra, Virginta 22313-1450 www.spile.gov

PAPER

02/04/2009

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/909,288	07/19/2001	Peter Robert Foley	CM2506	2173
THE PROCTE Global Legal D			EXAMINER DELCOTTO, GREGORY R	
Sycamore Buile 299 East Sixth CINCINNATI,			ART UNIT 1796	PAPER NUMBER
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

1	RECORD OF ORAL HEARING
2	
2 3 4 5	UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
4	
5	
6	BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
7	AND INTERFERENCES
8	
9	
10	Ex parte PETER ROBERT FOLEY
11	and HOWARD DAVID HUTTON
12	
13	
14	Appeal 2008-5694
15	Application 09/909,288
16	Technology Center 1700
17	
18	
19	Oral Hearing Held: Thursday, January 15, 2009
20	
21	
22	
23	Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, and
24	JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, Administrative Patent Judges
25	
26	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:
27	
28	MR. McKELVEY, ESQUIRE
29	
30	
31	
32	
33	
55	
34	

1	The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,		
2	January 15, 2009, commencing at 10:02 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and		
3	Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia, before		
4	Ashorethea Cleveland, Notary Public.		
5	THE USHER: Calendar Item 33, Mr. McKelvey.		
6	JUDGE GARRIS: Good morning, sir. Did I understand your		
7	name to be Mr. McKelvey?		
8	MR. McKELVEY: No relationship. I've gotten that before.		
9	I'm sure he looks just like me.		
10	JUDGE GARRIS: Sir, as you know, you have about 20		
11	minutes to present your case. Please begin.		
12	MR. McKELVEY: Thank you. May it please the Board.		
13	Well, this case is pretty extensive. It's about eight years old since the		
14	original filing. So, without going into detail into the facts, I'd like to jump		
15	straight into the primary issue of the case which is whether a Markush group		
16	in a secondary reference can imply or result in a decision that would indicate		
17	that there's some equivalence among the members of the Markush group.		
18	The Examiner in this case would argue yes but we haven't been able to find		
19	any authority, in either case law or in the MPEP to suggest that there would		
20	be any such equivalence.		
21	The Examiner relies on a case, In re Fout, but I believe so		
22	improperly. Fout really doesn't even address Markush groupings at all. If		
23	you run a search of the text of the opinion, you can't find the word		
24	"Markush" in it.		
25	It really is being used by analogy whether the Jepson styled		
26	claim being used in combination with a secondary reference to determine		

25

26

	Application 09/909,200		
1	whether there's some equivalence between the two methods that are		
2	described in those cases.		
3	So, by analogy, I wouldn't want to project any relevance really		
4	between Fout and a decision which would affect how you would determine		
5	equivalence in a Markush group.		
6	So, without even going into the case law, I think you can look		
7	directly at MPEP, Section 2144.06 which states that in order to rely on		
8	equivalence as a rationale supporting an obviousness rejection the		
9	equivalency must be recognized in the art and not the mere fact that the		
10	components at issue are functional or mechanical equivalence.		
11	You also have to keep in mind that the Examiner's primary		
12	argument is that the Markush group creates functional equivalency and not		
13	any other kind of substance equivalency among the members of the group.		
14	JUDGE ROBERTSON: Mr. McKelvey.		
15	MR. McKELVEY: Yes, sir.		
16	JUDGE ROBERTSON: Can I interrupt you for a moment?		
17	Could you point to me in the Examiner's rejection where he relies on the		
18	Markush group?		
19	MR. McKELVEY: Sir, if I can pull out the file, I can pull it out		
20	for you.		
21	JUDGE ROBERTSON: Or as an alternative, can you point out		
22	in the references?		
23	MR. McKELVEY: Well, in his reply brief, if you take a look		
24	in primary argument, in his response to our arguments, the Examiner cites In		

re Fout at the end of his statements saying that a Markush grouping of that

kind does imply equivalency among the members of the group.

JUDGE ROBERTSON: Yes; but that seems to be in response 1 2 to your argument that the Examiner has relied on a Markush group; and I'm 3 trying to identify the Markush group on which the Examiner relies. 4 In his rejection, the Examiner seems to state that the references 5 teach that the materials are equivalent but does not specifically say in the 6 rejection that there are Markush groups --7 MR. McKELVEY: All right. I do have a citation of the 8 rejection here. I have to flip through. I'm sorry. The Examiner says 9 specifically -- I'm sorry I don't have a specific reference but he says actually: 10 "In the cleaning and detergent field the listing of several 11 components in a Markush group useful in the composition as thickeners or 12 solvents for example does create a presumption that these materials are 13 equivalent thickening or solvent materials." 14 "Further one of ordinary skill in the art looking at such 15 reference will recognize these materials are equivalent for their disclosed 16 intended use within such a composition. It is not necessary that the prior art 17 specifically states that these materials are equivalence and the equivalency is 18 implicit since these materials are always together -- " Et cetera. 19 So, that was the Examiner's statement. 20 JUDGE ROBERTSON: But that statement is in response to 21 your characterization of references as teaching Markush groups; and I'm 22 trying to find in the references where there's a Markush group. I don't see 23 the "selected from the group consisting of" language that normally identifies 24 Markush groups. 25 MR. McKELVEY: Right, Well, the language used in the 26 argument is a Markush group; but in the reference itself, in column six, lines

1 60 through -- well, the end of the page -- creates this grouping where it says, 2 "Common thickeners such as polyacrylic, xanthin and gums, carboxylic 3 methylcellulose as well as Smectite clays and the like can be used herein." 4 JUDGE ROBERTSON: That's what I'm saving. Where is the 5 Markush group language in that, in that language? 6 MR. McKELVEY: I guess by form I wouldn't call it 7 necessarily Markush language in the text of the specification. 8 (Pause.) 9 MR. McKELVEY: I'm sorry. I'm failing to find it myself at 10 this stage but even without Markush language per se being used and 11 "selected from a group consisting of" a grouping here, it's still analogous to 12 Markush language and doesn't otherwise teach equivalence among the 13 members of that group. 14 JUDGE ROBERTSON: Now, you cite In re Ruff in response? 15 MR. McKELVEY: Yes. 16 JUDGE ROBERTSON: Can you tell me how that case is 17 applicable to the present situation? Here we have components disclosed in a 18 prior art reference. 19 MR. McKELVEY: Yes. 20 JUDGE ROBERTSON: The Markush group in Ruff was in a 21 claimed invention. So, how is that relevant in this case? MR. McKELVEY: Well, it's still a relevance, I would assert. 22 23 because In re Ruff still holds to the standard that you must show some kind 24 of an affirmative equivalency taught in the prior art reference in order for 25 equivalency to be established.

1 So, just reciting a number of ingredients, whether it's a laundry 2 list or short list of ingredients, In re Ruff still shows that you have to hold 3 true to the MPEP standard of showing equivalency affirmatively in the prior 4 art. 5 JUDGE ROBERTSON: And your position is the Culshaw's 6 disclosure in column six that states "common thickeners such as" and lists 7 those thickeners, including Smectite clays, that's not an art-recognized 8 equivalence? 9 MR. McKELVEY: Well, it doesn't necessarily show that they 10 are interchangeable. You can use lots of ingredients as functional thickeners 11 but it doesn't mean you can substitute one for the other and still end up with 12 the same results. There's no teaching affirmatively there that would show 13 that; and I believe that that's actually what's addressed in the MPEP section. 14 which is 2144.06. 15 Again, this section says that the mere fact that components 16 claimed as members of a Markush group -- we can put the Markush 17 language aside. It still says it cannot be relied upon to establish equivalency 18 of those components; and the example used in the reference says that the 19 mere fact that phthalocyanine and selenium function as equivalent photo 20 conductors of the claimed invention is not sufficient to establish that one 21 would have been obvious over the other. 22 So, those again would have the functional equivalency of photo 23 conductors but it doesn't necessarily mean according to the patent manual 24 that they would be interchangeable ingredients. 25 JUDGE GARRIS: Sir, why don't you go ahead and finish out 26 your presentation if there is anything else you care to present.

Appeal 2008-5694 Application 09/909,288

1		MR. McKELVEY: That's where we come out on this issue.
2		JUDGE GARRIS: Let me ask Judge Colaianni if he has any
3	questions.	
4		JUDGE COLAIANNI: No questions.
5		JUDGE GARRIS: Judge Robertson?
6		JUDGE ROBERTSON: No questions.
7		JUDGE GARRIS: I think that does it for today.
8		MR. McKELVEY: Okay. Well, thank you very much for your
9	time.	
10		JUDGE GARRIS: Thank you, Mr. McKelvey.
11		Whereupon, at approximately 10:14 a.m., the proceedings were
12	concluded.	